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1 Introduction 
A potential policy dilemma related to tourism investments arises in tourism 
destinations where there is unutilized land, unemployment and limited financial 
resources:1 how to allocate the land, by definition a limited resource, between two 
possible utilizations, either to hotels or to private holiday accommodations (second 
homes).2 In spite of its importance, the phenomenon of second homes has rarely 
been the focus of studies in the tourism economics literature.3 
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model to analyze the optimal 
development strategies for attracting tourism investments. Firstly, we are 
interested in those destinations where policy makers (public agents) do not have 
sufficient financial resources or know-how to initiate tourism investments in 
second homes and/or hotels, while firms (private agents) do not have sufficient 
financial resources (which is equivalent to the usual “credit rationing” hypothesis). 
Secondly, we want to solve a specific policy problem in which the two agents 
want to choose the optimal tourism investment between second homes or hotels 
when they have clashing interests for the allocation of the limited resources of land 
and capital. The introduction of incentives to investments, in order to attract 
financial resources, is a common policy for both developed and developing 
tourism destinations (Jenkins, 1982; Wanhill, 1986; Ward, 1989).  
A case history on Sardinia inspired this research.4 In 2006 in order to promote 
the development of the tourism sector, Sardinia earmarked 30 million Euros to 
_________________________ 
1 These conditions may arise in many tourism destinations, both developed and developing ones, but 
more frequently in Lesser Developed tourism Destinations (LDDs) where policy makers attempt to 
support economic growth by adopting policies designed to attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) 
and encouraging Technological Transfers (TT) (Kumi, 2006; Barrowclough, 2007). 
2 “Second homes” are private holiday accommodations which are left unoccupied for most of the 
year and are mainly used during periods of peak demand for tourism accommodation. 
3 See, for examples, Jaakson (1986), Deller et al. (1997), Hjalager et al. (2011), Saló and Garriga 
(2011). 
4 Sardinia is located in Italy and is the second-largest island in the Mediterranean Sea. Per capita 
income is the highest of Southern Italy and the tourism represents the main industry of the island, 
given its natural-resource endowment. For its territorial location and economic features can be 
regarded as a peripheral region, but it is also one of the most developed regions of Southern Italy. 
Sardinia is one of the Italian regions having wide autonomy of government. In particular, these 
regions have the legislative power to adopt their own “special statute”, which is a constitutional law. 
Sardinia statute gives the region the exclusive power to make laws in several fields, like tourism, 
land use, transport, urban, regional, and environmental planning. In particular, since over the past 
decades many coastal areas suffered the impact of new buildings (like second homes and hotels), the 
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finance private investments in renovation of hotels and building of second homes. 
As a consequence, the Firm “Chia Invest S.p.a.” presented a local development 
project for the South of Sardinia. The target of the investment project was to create 
a network of luxury resorts, and the project also included a large investment in 
second homes.5 Thus “Chia Invest S.p.a.” requested a building permit from the 
Sardinian government but this request created a policy conflict, given the 
preference of Sardinian government for hotels over second homes.  
The general idea of our contribution is that political economy is a political 
science regulating and limiting the potential conflicts between different agents or 
aims.6 We analyze situations where the policy maker has economic or institutional 
discretionary “power to regulate” conflicts, in order to determine when a 
compromise solution is preferable to a clash solution and under what conditions 
such a solution is preferable to the other. To answer these questions, we analyze a 
conflict resolution model, where a public agent and a private agent have clashing 
interests: the public agent wants to entice the private agent to make a specific 
choice using a given set of available policies. Our model shows that in cases of 
extreme conflict, a solution only exists if the agents have at least some common 
interests. 
We define “conflict” and “common interest” within the framework of non-
cooperative games, where there are two agents having objective functions 
characterized by the same variables, ),( yxF  and ),( yxf . Within this framework, 
we have: i) a “conflict” variable, if 
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Sardinian Regional Landscape Plan (see regional law no. 8 of November 25, 2004) bans new 
building located along the coastlines, and closed to environmental or cultural sites. 
5 Chia Invest S.p.a. invested 60milion Euros in the development of the “Chia area” and 70million 
Euros in the “Arbus area” (“Chia area” extended from the City of Pula to the City of Teulada, while 
“Arbus area” was the area of the municipality of Arbus). In particular, the investments in the “Chia 
area” included the construction of two golf courses with one club house, one indoor pool, the 
expansion of the Hotel Laguna (50 rooms) with swimming pool and spa. Finally, Chia Invest S.p.a. 
planned the Hotel Baia Chia renovation, the creation of a nature park and the transformation of 81 
rooms into second homes to be sold on the market. 
6 “As in political science, we study collective choice political institutions. We want to understand 
how policy decisions are made, what shapes the incentives and constraints of the policymakers taking 
those decisions, and how conflicts over policy are resolved” (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p. 1–
2). 
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this last case, it is necessary that at least one of the agents is interested in the 
“common interest” variable, provided that the other agent neglects that variable 
(benign neglect). If there is a conflict but not a common interest, i.e. 0=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
x
f
x
F , 
the only possible solution comes from the “technology of threat” (as developed by 
conflict economics), otherwise it is necessary to include a structural change to the 
game (e.g. a cooperative game). On the other hand, if the two agents are 
characterized by both a conflict and a common interest, it is also possible to find a 
compromise equilibrium. From a theoretical point of view, this economic policy 
problem can be analyzed as a conflict resolution model and/or a principal-agent 
model.7 As detailed above, in this paper we apply a conflict resolution model. 
Economic literature on conflicts can be traced back to seminal studies of 
Hirshleifer (1989) who developed the first model of conflicts among rival groups. 
The economics of conflicts analyzes the allocation of resources among different 
productive utilizations and the distribution of the corresponding products. The 
economics of conflicts defines these problems as distributive conflicts among 
groups, usually dealing with countries that have to take investment decisions in 
armaments (guns), while under the threat of war. Conflict resolution models 
develop several hypotheses and analyze the conditions for solving conflicts in a 
rational and effective way.8  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the main stylized facts and the 
theoretical framework of the model are presented. In Section 3 the model is set up. 
In Section 4 three different economic policies are analyzed and compared in terms 
of political consensus for the policy maker and of profits for the Firm: laissez faire 
(no intervention), taxation (indirect control) and a contractual solution that we 
define as de-taxation policy (de-taxation of reinvested profits). The conclusions 
summarize the main results of the paper and some future lines of research. 
_________________________ 
7 Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship between two agents (a principal and an 
agent) as a contract where the agent acts on behalf of the principal. The problem of clashing interests 
arises when the principal needs to convince the agent to pursue the principal’s interests. Principal-
agent theory only provides solutions when potential conflicts in contractual relationships include at 
least a minimum common interest between the agents. In the principal-agent model, the conflict 
variable is the agent’s effort, while the common interest variable is the outcome (which positively 
affects both the agent’s and the principal’s objective functions). For a microeconomics foundation of 
tourism supply, which is based on transactions cost and principal-agency theory, see Stabler et al. 
(2010). 
8 For a review on conflict economics, see Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) and for an application of 
conflict economics within the framework of game theory see Acocella et al. (2011). 
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2 Stylized Facts and Theoretical Framework 
To study this policy dilemma, we take into consideration two agents in the same 
tourism destination, who usually interact in the real world in the following way: (i) 
a Destination manager (public agent) who sets up the tourism destination-planning 
scheme, and (ii) a Firm (private agent) which builds second homes and/or hotels, 
according to the planning scheme, and then sells them on the market. In particular, 
second homes are sold to individual buyers, while hotels are sold in bulk to buyers 
who then rent them out a room at a time on a nightly basis. 
To emphasize the conflict between agents (arising when the Destination 
manager chooses to grant building permits for second homes or hotels), we 
represent the optimization problem as a linear model, where a potential conflict 
stems from the assumption of the two agents who have different (linear) 
preferences regarding the allocation of limited resources and thus clashing 
interests. The linear optimization problem allows for a comparison of two extreme 
solutions: a corner solution (clash) and an internal solution (compromise).9 In 
addition, if one agent has the “power to regulate” the conflict, she can enforce 
different policies to reach a given aim. Three different policies are considered: 
laissez faire (no intervention), taxation (indirect control) and de-taxation policy 
(de-taxation of reinvested profits) which is a temporary tax exemption on a share 
of reinvested profits. An example of implementation of the de-taxation policy is 
the partial de-taxation of reinvested profits introduced in Italy by the Law 
383/2001. More recently, a similar policy has also been recommended by the 
European Economic and Social Committee.10 
Laissez faire represents a conflict solution in which the Firm wins, taxation 
policy is a conflict solution in which the policy maker wins, while de-taxation 
policy is a compromise solution based on a mutual agreement between agents 
_________________________ 
9 If the agents are characterized by (different) non-linear preferences the problem does not change 
substantially, even though the clash and the compromise solutions are both internal solutions. 
Therefore the distance between the two clashing individual optimal choices is smaller, but it is 
possible to show, as suggested by an anonymous reviewer, that a compromise solution may still be 
preferable for both agents, and consists of a linear combination of their optimal choices as it is the 
case of linear preferences. 
10 On 2008, September 11th the European Economic and Social Committee in the “Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the voluntary participation by 
organisations in a Community Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS)” has recommended to 
better promote and give more support at the national and Community levels, by drawing on the 
Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP), European Investment Bank (EIB) 
and Structural Funds resources, as regards public procurement, tax relief, keeping registration and 
renewal fees down, and de-taxation of reinvested profits. 
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(synallagmatic contract).11 Accordingly, given that the policy maker prefers to 
implement an “authoritative policy” (taxation policy), while the Firm prefers no 
intervention (laissez faire), we want to discover when a “contractual policy” (de-
taxation policy) is preferred by both agents. 
Two main stylized facts emerge in this policy issue: (i) the average market 
price (market value per square meter) of new second homes is often higher than 
new hotels market price;12 (ii) the economic impact effect, in terms of costs and 
employment, and the environmental impact effect of the two alternative 
investments is analogous, but the tourism multiplier effect on local economic 
development is higher for hotels. In fact, hotel guests tend to have higher average 
daily per capita expenses, in terms of indirect tourism expenses, with respect to 
second home occupants (Piga, 2003b).13 Because of the first stylized fact 
(different average market prices) the Firm would prefer the investment in second 
homes, while according to the second stylized fact (different impact effects) the 
Destination manager would prefer the investment in hotels.14 
Regarding the first stylized fact, the characteristics of hotels and second homes 
which can justify their different market prices are: (i) second homes may represent 
a final durable consumption good while hotels are an instrumental good, thus 
hotels represent a riskier investment; (ii) the Firm’s production function yields, 
ceteris paribus, a higher number of marketable square meters (output) for second 
homes than for hotels; (iii) second homes last longer than hotels and therefore 
_________________________ 
11 In civil law systems, a “synallagmatic contract” is a contract in which each party is bound to 
provide something to the other party. In common law jurisdictions, it is the equivalent of a bilateral 
contract in which each party makes an enforceable promise. 
12 Mazzuchelli (2007) estimates that in the Italian tourism destinations’ real-estate market the 
average market price of hotels is equal to 2,824.64 Euros per square meter, while the second homes 
average market price is equal to 3,708.82 Euros per square meter. Furthermore, Kim et al. (2002) 
analyze the performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) over the 1993–1999 period, and 
specifically they compare the performance of hotel REITs with six other REITs sectors and with the 
overall market. They find that hotel REITs carried the highest market risk and underperformed the 
other REITs sectors (office, industrial, etc.). 
13 “Moreover, self-catering accommodations, such as second homes, do not generate as high 
multiplier effects as hotels” (Piga, 2003b, p. 900).  
14 Since multinational firms, including hotels, frequently implement technological transfers (Kumi, 
2006), tourism destinations may benefit from technological spillovers (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; 
Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Even considering the different impact effects of second homes and 
hotels, this is another reason why the Destination manager might prefer hotel investments to support 
economic growth. 
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have a lower depreciation rate;15 (iv) hotels have higher management and 
maintenance costs since their occupation rate is higher than for second homes. 
Because of these reasons, for a firm the profit margin of investments in second 
homes can be considerably higher than those of investments in hotels (Kim et al., 
2002). 
According to the second stylized fact, investments in second homes yield 
immediate employment growth but, at the same time, lead to a type of tourism 
with lower development rates. Moreover, tourism investments, both in second 
homes and hotels, may generate environmental negative externalities (Piga, 
2003a), though investment in hotels may also bring about positive externalities 
(tourism multiplier effect) which can offset, at least partially, the negative ones. 
On the contrary, investments in second homes may induce a net negative 
externality because the positive effects (tourism multiplier effect) do not 
necessarily offset the negative ones (environmental effects). 
Within the historical and theoretical framework that inspired this research, the 
Destination manager: (i) has a limited financial budget (liquidity constraint) and 
cannot finance the investment choices alone;16 (ii) does not have sufficient know-
how to make investments herself. The Destination manager aims at maximizing 
her political consensus, so that her objective function can be interpreted as a 
measurement of the gain or loss of her political consensus, like gained or lost 
votes. For example, a zero value means no gained votes, a positive value signals a 
certain amount of gained votes, etc. (Girard and Gartner, 1993). Moreover, the 
Firm: (i) has a limited financial budget (liquidity constraint) to invest in tourism 
destination; (ii) is a “price taker”, since it acts in a small tourism destination, 
where market prices are fixed by the rest of the world. 
The Firm’s financial resources and the second homes/hotels market prices are 
therefore taken as constant (exogenous variables), as well as building costs and 
thus profit margins, while the control variables are the square meters of area 
chosen for building second homes and/or hotels, given the disposable land 
(physical constraint) and capital (budget constraint). The Firm, as usual, is profit 
maximizing. 
As in the real world, the Firm also has the opportunity to exercise a third 
“outside option”, if it is preferable, consisting of building a third type of buildings 
_________________________ 
15 Corgel (2007) estimates that the long-run obsolescence rate of hotels is equal to 1.93% per year, 
while Smith (2004) estimates that the average depreciation rate of real estates is included in the range 
0.9–1.3% per year. Moreover, Colwell and Ramsland (2003) estimated that the long-run rate of 
obsolescence of retail real estates is equal to 0.9% per year. 
16 For the same reason the policy maker cannot provide subsidies to firms. 
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in a different location. For example, the Firm could prefer to build homes in a 
different location, i.e. private accommodations which are occupied throughout the 
year by local residents and workers. 
Finally, coherently with the above stylized facts we assume the following 
parameters affect the Destination manager’s objective function: (i) a high positive 
effect (gain of consensus) for hotels built by the Firm; (ii) a low positive effect (at 
the limit null effect) for second homes built by the Firm; (iii) a negative effect 
(loss of consensus) for unutilized land, i.e. the square meters of the building area 
(planned in the planning scheme) not actually utilized. The utilized land can be 
regarded as a proxy variable of the employment in the tourism destination: in other 
words, if the square meters of actually built area are less than those planned in the 
tourism destination-planning scheme, land, labour and capital in the tourism 
destination may be underemployed.17 
3 The Model 
We assume there are two agents, agent X and agent Y. Agent X is a policy maker 
(Destination manager) having an economic or institutional “power to regulate”, 
while agent Y is a private agent (Firm) having to choose how much to invest in two 
distinct investments x and y. Investments x are the Square Meters (SM) built as 
hotels; y are the SM built as second homes; s = x + y are the SM of total area 
actually built up by the Firm in the tourism destination S. Furthermore, we suppose 
Ss ≤≤0  and Syx ≤≤ );(0 , where S is the entire building area in the tourism 
destination, defined in the tourism destination-planning scheme. The allocation of 
variable s is the cause of a conflict between the agents, since we assume they have 
different preferences on the division of s between their choice variables x and y. 
The Firm also has the opportunity to exercise an “outside option”, which 
consists of choosing a third type of investment z in a different location Z, with 
Zz ≤≤0 . Investments z are the SM built by the Firm as alternative and different 
building investments. The physical constraint z ≤ Z is a constraint in the alternative 
location. 
For simplicity and without losing generality of results, we assume the general 
condition that the Firm’s investments costs c > 0 (building costs per SM) are the 
same for each investment x, y or z (hotels, second homes and homes), while 
_________________________ 
17 In the real world the Destination manager may have a lot of other preferences or issues, e.g. if 
there are enough local workers to staff the hotels, housing for hotel workers, etc. 
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building market prices are not equal according to the above stylized facts. This 
assumption implies that the Firm has a budget constraint,18 because it cannot 
spend more than the total available financial resources F > 0, such that: 
c(x + y + z) = c(s + z) ≤ F [1] 
therefore s ≤ F/c ; x, y and z ≤ F/c. 
Additionally, the Firm can reinvest the net profits made on investment s, such 
that the value of its financial resources F increases. In that case, the budget 
constraint [1] is no longer binding, such that x, y or z > F/c, but costs increase to a 
higher level c' > c, according to the law of diminishing returns (piecewise 
function).  
3.1 Clashing Interests 
The Firm’s preference function is linear19 and is characterized by different 
coefficients when the Firm invests within the limits of the budget constraint [1] or 
in the case of reinvested profits. Defining p as hotels market price, v as second 
homes market price and q as homes market price per SM, given c (the building 
cost per SM), we can define profit margin per SM: m = p – c for hotels, n = v – c 
for second homes and r = q – c for homes. 
If the Firm invests within the limits of the budget constraint [1], according to 
the above stylized facts we can assume that q < p < v or, alternatively, the 
following profit condition: 
n > m ≥ 0 [2] 
such that the Firm strictly prefers y to x as far as the investment in S is concerned. 
If the Firm reinvests the profits made out of investments s, the value of its 
financial resources F and its costs will increase (from c to c'). So, the Firm’s 
profits of investments in S will decrease to lower levels m' < m for investment x, 
and nn <'  for investment y. Even in this case, the Firm continues to strictly prefer 
y to x, that is n' > m' ≥ 0.  
_________________________ 
18 Taking into consideration a budget constraint is equivalent to introducing in the model a “credit 
rationing” hypothesis. 
19 In order to emphasize the clash of interests between the agents, we specify their preferences as 
linear functions, such that their corresponding optimal solutions yield opposite results, x > 0 and y = 0 
or vice versa, since the linear preference functions do not allow for internal solutions. As mentioned 
above, we define “compromise” a solution characterized by equilibrium values of x and y where x 
and y > 0. 
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Let us now take into consideration the alternative investments z in the different 
location Z. For the Firm we assume that r is the profits of investment z, where 
m > r > n' if cFz /≤ , while if cFz /> , according to the law of diminishing 
returns, the profit decreases to the level r' < r. This means that if the Firm is 
investing within the budget constraint [1] it is convenient to invest only in S, but in 
the case of reinvested profits it will be convenient to invest the extra budget 
coming from the profits made out of investments in S only in Z. Therefore, Firm 
profits conditions can be summarized as follows: 
n > m > r > 0 if x, y and z ≤ F/c [3] 
r > n' > m' > 0 if x or y > F/c and z ≤ F/c [4] 
such that within the limits of budget constraint [1] the best option for the Firm is 
investment y, while in the case of reinvested profits, the Firm strictly prefers to 
choose the alternative investment in homes z. 
For the Destination manager we assume that d > 0 is the political consensus 
gained for x (the SM actually built as hotels), while b ≥ 0 is the political consensus 
gained for y (the SM actually built as second homes). According to the above 
stylized facts, we can suppose that:  
d > b ≥ 0 [5] 
such that the Destination manager prefers that the Firm chooses to build hotels.20 
Therefore, from [2] and [5] we can see that agents have clashing interests by 
construction: the Firm strictly prefers y to x, while the Destination manager strictly 
prefers x to y. Moreover, the assumption of limited financial resources implies that 
the budget constraint [1] is binding: 
F/c < S [6] 
which means that the Firm’s financial resources are limited and not sufficient to 
use the entire building area. In other words, both agents will be negatively affected 
by this lack of financial resources. This assumption also implies that the 
Destination manager herself does not have sufficient financial resources to finance 
construction in order to utilize the whole building area and fill the gap (S – s), or to 
give incentives to the Firm. 
_________________________ 
20 Since voters always prefer full employment of all inputs (labor, capital and land), the Destination 
manager always prefers hotels to second homes. 
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3.2 Common Interests 
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the “compromise” solution is a possible 
solution only if agents have common interests. Thus we assume that both the Firm 
and the Destination manager are also interested in the gap (S – s) ≥ 0, that is the 
difference between the SM of the building area and the SM of the area actually 
built up. The agents common interest is therefore to minimize the unutilized land. 
Weighting the gap by the coefficient aY ≤ 0 for the Firm, and aX < 0 for the 
Destination manager, agents preferences are negatively affected by the gap 
)( sS − . 
According to these assumptions, agents preference functions become as 
follows: 



≤>′>′>+′+′+−
≤>>+++−
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/  and  ,ifwith)(
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bydxsSayxP XX ++−= )(),(    bd >with    [8] 
In order to prove that a compromise solution does exist, it is sufficient to 
include a common interest at least in one of agents preferences. Therefore, it is 
necessary that only the Destination manager is actually affected by the gap 
)( sS − , while the Firm is just indifferent, such that aY = 0. In this way, the 
Destination manager strictly prefers hotels to second homes but also prefers the 
lowest unutilized land, while the Firm prefers second homes to hotels and neglects 
the loss for the unutilized land (benign neglect). 
4 The Policies 
Given agents objective functions [7] and [8], Firm’s optimal choice is not equal to 
Destination manager’s optimal choice and this situation generates a policy 
problem. To face this policy problem, we compare three different possible 
policies: (i) laissez faire policy, where the Destination manager allows the Firm to 
freely choose; (ii) taxation of investment in second homes by levying a tax on 
second homes, which needs to be high enough to reverse the profitability for the 
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Firm to build hotels instead of second homes;21 (iii) de-taxation policy, consisting 
of taxation of investment in second homes together with a temporary tax 
exemption on a share of reinvested profits.  
Through the third policy (temporary tax exemption regime), the Destination 
manager levies a limited tax on second homes and gives the Firm the freedom to 
build either second homes or hotels, in exchange for its commitment to reinvest 
(into the tourism destination) the profits from building and selling second homes. 
We shall show that this de-taxation policy represents a compromise solution 
between agents, since it yields an equilibrium with x, y > 0. However, before 
analyzing the compromise solution, to better show the clash of interests between 
agents we define the conflict solutions as benchmark against which to compare 
other solutions. 
The Destination manager makes her optimal choice according to the following 
maximization problem: 
0,,  ;  s.t.  
)(),(max
,
≥≤+=
++−=
syxSyxs
bydxsSayxP XXyx  [9] 
Given previous assumptions on parameters d > b and aX < 0, problem [9] has 
the following straightforward solution: 
x* = s = S; y* = 0 [10] 
according to which the Destination manager prefers that the Firm invests only in 
hotels, for an amount equal to the maximum value of s = S. This solution yields the 
following value for Destination manager preference: 
PX(x*, 0) = dS [11] 
Before checking if a compromise solution between agents is feasible, and 
under what conditions an equilibrium based on a compromise (with x, y > 0 and 
s → S) is an optimal solution, we define as laissez faire policy the suboptimal 
solution for the policy maker, which instead corresponds to the optimal solution 
for the private agent. 
_________________________ 
21 According to Poole (1970) and Weitzman (1974), an equivalent policy would be a direct control 
regulation, that is introducing within the planning scheme some quantitative constraints on second 
homes. One example would be denying planning permission to build second homes (that is setting 
y ≡ 0) enforced by a penalty. This direct control policy would yield exactly the same solution as 
taxation (y = 0), but in the case of taxation the solution is the outcome of a firm’s choice, while in the 
case of regulation it is the consequence of conformity with the law. 
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4.1 Laissez Faire Policy 
Without any intervention by the Destination manager, the Firm has the possibility 
to choose its optimal investment. In order to simplify the computations, we shall 
logically split this optimization problem into two separate stages: (i) maximization 
of nymxyxPY +=),( , and (ii) maximization of rzzPY =′ )( . Therefore, given 
conditions [3] and [4] the two problems can be solved sequentially stage by stage. 
This procedure gives the same results of solving the problem in one stage, because 
it is a separable optimization problem (since we assumed agents linear preference 
functions). 
In the first stage the Firm makes its optimal choice, by solving the following 
maximization problem: 
0,,  ;  ;/,  ;/  s.t.  
),(  max
,
≥≤+=≤≤
+=
syxSyxscFyxcFs
nymxyxPYyx  [12] 
Given conditions [3] and [4], and taking into consideration only the solution 
which respects the binding budget constraint [6], problem [12] has the following 
straightforward solution: 
x** = 0; y** = F/c = s < S [13] 
which is consistent with coefficients n and m in condition [3]. Therefore, the Firm 
chooses to invest F only in the variable y, but for a lower value than the maximum 
S. The solution [13] is drawn in Figure 1 (see point E). 
In Figure 1, the two bold vertical and horizontal lines represent the 
compatibility constraints x and y ≤ F/c; line AA' represents the physical constraint 
s = x + y ≤ S; line BB' represents the financial constraint c(x + y) ≤ F; dotted lines 
DL represent Firm’s iso-profit curves: ∀ PY, x = PY/m – ny/m. 
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Figure 1. Laissez Faire Policy 
x
y
B = F/c
A = S
A’ = S0 B’=F/c=y**
E
D
L  
In the second stage, the Firm reinvests the extra budget coming from the 
profits made on investment y**, and therefore the budget constraint [1] is no longer 
binding. Since the Firm’s profits decrease to n' and m', condition [4] represents the 
new margin profits. Therefore, the Firm reinvests in Z all the profit made out of 
investment y**, and its profit becomes PY(0, y**) = n(F/c), by solving the following 
maximization problem: 
0  ;  ;/  ;/),0(  s.t.  
)(  max
** ≥≤≤≤
=′
zZzcFzcyPz
rzzP
Y
Yz  [14] 
Given condition [4], problem [14] has the following straightforward solution: 
z** = PY(0, y**)/c = n(F/c2) [15a] 
 )/()( 2** cFrnzPY =′  [15b] 
which is consistent with the coefficient r in the objective function [14] if and only 
if z** ≤ F/c, that is n ≤ c. Therefore, laissez faire solution yields the following 
preferences values: 
)/1)(/()(),0(),,0( ******** crcFnzPyPzyP YY
tot
Y +=′+=  [16a] 
)/()/(),0( ** cFbcFSayP XX +−−=  [16b] 
Comparing the preferences of Destination manager [11] and [16b], it is easy to 
verify that PX(x*, 0) > PX(0, y**), given that d > b by definition. Moreover, 
solutions [10] and [13] yield opposite results for both agents (x > 0 and y = 0 or 
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vice versa), such that they have extreme clashing interests as a result of our 
assumption of linear preferences. 
Given these results, it is clear that the Destination manager prefers to enforce 
some policies instead of choosing no intervention at all. Since the policy maker 
can use always its “power to regulate” to set conflict rules, the Destination 
manager can enforce a policy by imposing restrictions and/or constraints to the 
Firm’s behaviour in order to win the conflict. 
4.2 Taxation Policy 
To pursue her strict preference for investment in hotels with respect to investment 
in second homes, the Destination manager can enforce an indirect control 
consisting of levying a tax 0 < t ≤ 1 on n (profits of the investment y). In this 
sense, tax t represents an instrument of indirect control like an “environmental tax” 
or “Pigouvian tax” in tourism, because it is only directed at stimulating the 
investment in hotels, and not at collecting tax yields. For this reason, tax t does not 
explicitly enter in the Destination manager’s objective function.22 
Moreover, from now on we assume that if the Firm is indifferent about its 
investment choices, then it has an epsilon preference for Destination manager’s 
optimal solution, that is for investment in hotels. Therefore, the Destination 
manager needs to levy a tax t such to modify the Firm’s profits so that n(1 – t) ≤ m. 
Given this condition, the optimal tax t° needs to be included in the following 
threshold: 
10 <°≤−< t
n
mn  [17] 
which means that the Destination manager needs to set a minimum limit for the 
tax. In this case, in the first stage Firm maximization problem becomes: 
0,,  ;  ;/,  ;/  s.t.  
)1(),(  max
,
≥≤+=≤≤
°−+=
syxSyxscFyxcFs
ytnmxyxPYyx  [18] 
which solution is: 
_________________________ 
22 Since the goal of a “Pigouvian tax” is the environmental control (or internalizing the externalities), 
equilibrium investments in second homes will not be profitable any more, such that the 
corresponding tax yields would be null. For this reason within the framework of our model it is 
reasonable to exclude the tax from the policy maker objective function. 
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x1 = F/c = s < S; y1 = 0 [19] 
According to solution [19], the Firm chooses only investment in hotels, but for 
a lower value than the maximum S. Once again, solution [19] is consistent with 
coefficients n and m in objective function [18]. The solution [19] is drawn in 
Figure 2 (see point E), where the two bold vertical and horizontal lines represent 
the compatibility constraints, line AA' represents the physical constraint, line BB' 
represents the financial constraint, and dotted lines DL represent the Firm’s iso-
profit curves: ∀ PY, x = PY/m – n(1 – t°)y/m.  
Then, in the second stage, given condition [4], the Firm reinvests in Z the extra 
budget coming from the profits made out of investment x1, and its profit becomes 
PY(x1, 0) = m(F/c). By following the same procedure used in problem [14], the 
solution is given by z1 = PY(x1, 0)/c = m(F/c2), under the condition that z1 ≤ F/c, 
that is m ≤ c, which is already implied by the more binding condition n ≤ c. 
Therefore, taxation policy yields the following agents preferences: 
)/1)(/()()0,(),0,( 1111 crcFmzPxPzxP YY
tot
Y +=′+=  [20a] 
)/()/()0,( 1 cFdcFSaxP XX +−−=  [20b] 
Comparing Destination manager preferences [16b] and [20b], it is easy to 
verify that PX(x1, 0) > PX(0, y**), given condition [5]. In other words, the policy 
maker strictly prefers taxation policy to laissez faire. 
Figure 2: Taxation Policy 
x
y
B = F/c=x1
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4.3 De-Taxation Policy 
The Destination manager can implement another policy in order to pursue her 
strict preference for investment in hotels with respect to investment in second 
homes, besides the aim of decreasing the gap )( sS − . In fact, through de-taxation 
policy the Destination manger aims to avoid the drawback of taxation, that is the 
exclusion of profitability of investment in second homes. At the same time she 
wants to provide an effective incentive for the Firm to use the whole building area, 
reinvesting the profits made out of investment in second homes. If a compromise 
solution based on a mutual agreement between agents exists and if this policy is 
preferred by both agents, a contractual agreement between them can be realized. 
We check now under which conditions this agreement can be made. 
The Destination manager levies a tax 0 < t < 1 on n and in addition grants a 
temporary tax exemption on a share of reinvested profits. Due to this tax 
exemption, the Firm’s financial resources F increase, so that it may invest enough 
to fill the gap )( sS − . The value of the Firm’s financial resources F increases by 
the amount ΔF = ny. Under this condition, the Firm’s financial resources become 
equal to F + ΔF = F + ny. Accordingly, in the first stage the new maximization 
problem becomes: 
0,,  ;  ;/,  ;/)(  s.t.  
)1(),(  max
,
≥≤+=≤+≤
−+=
syxSyxscFyxcnyFs
ytnmxyxPYyx  [21] 
The solution of problem [21] is not straightforward, so it is helpful to use 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3: The De-Taxation Policy 
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In Figure 3, the two bold vertical and horizontal lines represent the compatibil-
ity constraints x and y ≤ F/c, while the other lines represent the implicit functions 
of maximization problem [21]: line AA' represents (as in Figures 1 and 2) the 
physical constraint s = x + y ≤ S (or x = S – y); line BB' represents the financial 
constraint c(x + y) ≤ F + ny (or x = F/c – (c – n)y/c), where we assume the 
condition n ≤ c; dotted lines DL represent the Firm’s profits (iso-profit curves): 
∀ PY, x = PY/m – n(1 – t)y/m. 
The necessary condition to solve problem [21] in point E, and therefore make 
compromise a feasible solution, is that )grad(BB'grad(DL))AA'(grad << , which 
is solved by: 
c
nc
m
tn −
−<
−
−<−
)1(1  [22] 
Condition [22] implies that the Destination manager needs to impose a tax 
which is included between a minimum and a maximum limit, in order to have a 
contractual solution preferred by both agents. If the Destination manger levies the 
optimal tax t* at the minimum value, we obtain: 
c
mtt ≤−°< *0  [23] 
which is always true if n ≤ c. 
Given conditions [3], [4] and [22], in Figure 3 it is easy to verify that at the 
equilibrium point E the Firm maximizes its profit function PY(x, y) subject to all 
the constraints in [21], i.e. the possibilities frontier.23 Therefore, point E represents 
a compromise solution between the clashing interests of agents, with x, y > 0. 
The equilibrium values of x and y can be computed through the constraints 
intersection: 
n
FScy −=2   [24a] 
n
ncSFx )(2
−−
=  [24b] 
_________________________ 
23 From the “simplex method” we know that the maximum of a linear function coincides with the 
“peak” of the possibilities frontier. 
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Ssyx ==+ 22  [24c] 
According to solutions [24], the Firm chooses both investments in hotels and 
in second homes, which represent a compromise solution, and thanks to the 
additional financial resources stemming from the tax exemption on reinvested 
profits, the Firm’s optimal choice is exactly equal to the total building area, so that 
there is no unutilized limited resource: 0)( =− sS .24 
Overall, being 
[ ]
n
FSctnncSFmyxPY
))(1()((),( 22
−−+−−
=  the profit in 
destination S and 
c
yxrPzP YY
),()( 222 =′  the profit in location Z, the de-taxation 
policy yields the following agents preferences: 
[ ]





 +





 −−+−−=′+=
c
r
n
FSctnncSFmzPyxPzyxP YY
tot
Y 1
))(1()(()(),(),,( 222222  [25a] 
[ ]
n
FScbncSFdyxPX
)()((),( 22
−+−−
=
 
[25b] 
In order to implement the compromise solution as a synallagmatic contract, it 
must be preferred by both agents: the Destination manager gives the permission to 
build second homes and the Firm agrees to reinvest de-taxed profits. Therefore, it 
is necessary to verify if this solution dominates, or at least is indifferent to, the 
other solutions in terms of preferences. This is true when specific conditions are 
verified (see Appendix). Under these conditions, the Destination manager 
proposes a contract to the Firm, and the Firm accepts the compromise solution 
proposed by the Destination manager, because both strictly prefer the de-taxation 
policy to taxation. 
In summary, with our model we prove that the policy maker needs to set a 
minimum tax (but not a maximum one) in order to implement an “authoritative 
policy” (taxation policy). On the contrary, a “contractual policy” (de-taxation 
policy) is preferred by both agents only if there is also a maximum limit for the 
tax. Obviously, this policy can be implemented only if specific conditions are met 
(see Appendix). 
_________________________ 
24 See Appendix for the sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution. 
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5 Conclusions 
Both well-developed and still-developing tourism destinations often are interested 
in undertaking tourism investments in second homes and/or hotels. When the 
Destination managers want to support economic growth, they need to adopt 
policies designed to attract tourism investments. However, a potential policy 
dilemma arises when the Destination manager and the Firm have clashing interests 
in the allocation of limited resources of land and capital, and they have to choose 
the optimal tourism investment between second homes or hotels. When financial 
resources are not sufficient to fully utilize all the land earmarked for tourism 
investments, we analyzed three different policies which could provide a solution to 
this policy problem: no intervention (laissez faire), taxation and de-taxation policy. 
The idea of our contribution is that it may be preferable, for both agents, to 
regulate their potential conflicts by enforcing a compromise solution, which 
consists in a de-taxation policy, rather than by implementing a taxation policy 
(indirect control). 
Our model shows that some parameter values do exist where the de-taxation 
policy dominates, or at least is indifferent to, the taxation. Specifically, the de-
taxation policy is preferable when the financial resources of the Firm are not 
sufficient to utilize the entire building area. In this case, the Destination manager 
prefers to grant the building permit for second homes, but in exchange for a 
commitment from the Firm to reinvest (into the tourism destination) its profits 
from building and selling second homes. Under certain parametric conditions, this 
compromise solution may be preferred by both the Destination manager and the 
Firm, since they reach a higher optimal solution.  
Regarding the Destination manager, the de-taxation policy dominates the other 
policy if: (i) the Firm decides to reinvest the profits from second homes, such that 
its financial resources are high enough to utilize the whole building area; (ii) the 
Destination manager is primarily interested in the full utilization of the entire 
building area (as planned in the tourism destination-planning scheme) rather than 
the lower positive externality on tourism economy (and thus lower gain of political 
consensus) brought about by building second homes instead of hotels. 
Regarding the Firm, thanks to the de-taxation policy, its profit function 
achieves a higher value with respect to taxation if there is a maximum limit for the 
tax. In this case, the Firm prefers the policy of partial de-taxation of the reinvested 
profits instead of being subject to simple taxation (or to a direct regulation policy). 
In particular, we found that while the policy maker only needs to set a minimum 
limit for the tax (but not a maximum one) to implement a taxation policy, a de-
taxation policy of reinvested profits is preferred by both agents only if there is also 
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a maximum limit for the tax. An example of possible application of this de-
taxation policy within this economic framework, is given by the Italian Law 
383/2001, although it has yet to be applied to this type of issue.25 
In general, our application proves that if there are clashing interests between 
agents and the agents have at least some common interests, a compromise solution 
for the conflict may exist. 
Finally, a potential future line of research could consist in finding alternative 
policies, like relaxing the liquidity constraint of the Firm, and thus the credit 
rationing hypothesis. All the possible public interventions that facilitate borrowing 
for the Firm (like credit facilities) represent possible examples of such policies 
(public-private partnerships, project financing, subsidized credits, no-interest 
bearing credits, public credits, etc.).26 
Furthermore, since investments in hotels or second houses may induce a net 
negative externality, because of the related negative environmental effects, a 
further extensions of this research could consist in taking explicitly into account 
the potential sustainable development issues.27 To do that, in our model the 
tourism destination-planning scheme (and the corresponding amount of building 
area) may be considered as an endogenous variable, and the sustainable (economic 
and environmental) issues could be included in the objective function of the 
Destination manager. In this way, the allocation of the total available land between 
building and non-building area, could be considered as the first stage of the game 
between the Destination manager and the Firm. 
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25 The Italian Law 383/2001, so called “Tremonti-bis”, introduced the de-taxation of reinvested 
profits to support new investments by firms. More precisely, the law established that business income 
is exempt from taxation for an amount equal to 50% of the difference between the total amount of 
capital investment made in the current fiscal period and the average level of investment made in the 
previous five fiscal periods, excluding the highest of these five values from the calculation. 
26 Nevertheless, since we do not take into consideration the implementation costs of the economic 
policies, we can not define the most efficient one (second best analysis). For this same reason, we do 
not implement any non-neutral taxation. For example, as suggested by an anonymous reviewer, if we 
include the tax in the Destination manager’s objective function and if the Destination manager can 
use tax revenues to relax her financial constraint and undertake the tourism investments on her own, 
the indirect and direct control policies may not be equivalent. 
27 For example, nowadays the Sardinian government faces problems related to the economic and 
environmental sustainability of past tourism development.  
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Appendix 
A) Condition for the existence of a compromise solution 
Solution [24a] is consistent with coefficients n and m in [21] under the condition 
that cFy /0 2 ≤< , where y2 > 0 by assumption [6] and cFy /2 ≤  if and only if 
]/)[( cncFSc +≤ , which entails the parametric condition ]/)[( cncFScF +≤< . 
Accordingly, solution [24b] is consistent with coefficients n and m in [21] under 
the condition that cFx /0 2 ≤< , where x2 > 0 if and only if S(c – n) < F and 
cFx /2 ≤  by assumption [6]. Overall, solutions [24] are consistent with coefficients n 
and m under the parametric condition ]/)[()( cncFScFncS +≤<<− . 
Then, in the second stage the Firm reinvests the extra budget coming from the 
profits gained by investing in S, PY(x2, y2), only in Z, given that through this policy 
the whole land S is utilized in equilibrium (see [24c]). By following the same 
procedure, the solution is given by z2 = PY(x2, y2)/c, under the condition that 
z2  ≤  F/c, that is PY(x2, y2) ≤ F, which is true if and only if: 
[ ] F
n
FSctnncSFm
≤
−−+−− ))(1()((  
This last condition is always verified for any parameter values. 
B) Condition for Destination manager’s proposal 
We have to compare Destination manager preferences with de-taxation policy 
[25b] and with taxation [20b], in order to verify that PX(x2, y2) ≥ PX(x1, 0), that is: 
[ ]



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
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After some simple steps we obtain: 
nc
bcnnad X
−
+−
≤  [26] 
C) Condition for Firm’s acceptance  
We have to compare the Firm’s profits under de-taxation policy [25a] and under 
taxation [20a], in order to verify that ),0,(),,( 11222 zxPzyxP
tot
Y
tot
Y ≥ , that is: 
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After some simple steps, we obtain: 
c
mt
nc
ncmt +°=−−≤ )(1  [27]  
which is the same upper limit we found in [23]. 
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